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1 Introduction
The enforcement of compliance with tax regulation is a complex task.1 This is
particularly the case when the administrative capacity of the tax authority is low, as
is often the case in developing and transition countries (Bahl and Bird, 2008). This
paper draws on some international experiences in ﬁghting tax evasion to identify tools
that can be used to reduce underreporting by employed labor, small and medium
enterprises, self-employed, and professionals.
I will analyze in some details two policies: the Italian "Business Sector Analysis",
which targets small and medium enterprises, self-employed, and professionals and the
Bulgarian "Minimum Social Insurance Thresholds", which is aimed at employees.
In the Italian system, taxpayers reporting revenues below a certain threshold are
subject to more intense scrutiny by the tax authority, while in the Bulgarian case,
social security contributions paid by ﬁrms and employees should be above a certain
threshold. In both cases, the thresholds depend on quantities that are correlated with
income and are more easily observed. As these thresholds represent "indirect means
to ascertain tax liability, which diﬀer from the usual rules based on the taxpayer’s
accounts" (Thuronyi, 1996), they belong to the category of presumptive taxation
methods, with the Italian system being rebuttable and the Bulgarian one irrebutable.
In this paper, I ﬁrst formally model the impact of minimum thresholds by explic-
itly taking into account the low administrative capacity characterizing many devel-
oping and transition countries. In particular, I depart from the assumption of perfect
detection in case of an audit that is standard in the literature. This assumption is
problematic for developed countries (see the studies by Feinstein, 1991, and Erard,
1997, for the US case) and is clearly untenable for developing and transition ones.
The model shows that the introduction of a threshold creates a spike and a "missing2
middle" in the distribution of declared incomes and highlights under which conditions
introducing a threshold is likely to increase net revenues for the tax authority.
The use of thresholds is of particular interest for two set of reasons. From a
normative perspective, minimum thresholds have been found to describe the optimal
auditing strategy in several settings. Reingaum and Wilde (1985) compare a "stan-
dard random audit policy" to "an ’audit cutoﬀ’ policy, in which an agent triggers
an audit if reported income is ’too low’" and ﬁnd the latter to weakly dominate
the former. Similar results are also found in Sanchez and Sobel (1993) and Macho-
Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997). A recent contribution is Bigio and Zilberman
(2010) who study the optimal monitoring of self-employed entrepreneurs, allowing
for the tax authority to condition the monitoring strategy on labor input. They ﬁnd
that it is optimal for the tax authority to calculate inputted income as a function
of labor and then audit entrepreneurs who report below inputted income. A second
reason why thresholds are of interest is that, from an administrative point of view,
minimum thresholds are, at least potentially, easy to understand for the taxpayer
and to implement for the tax authority. As Bird (2004) notices "[t]he best tax policy
in the world is worth little if it cannot be implemented eﬀectively" and this con-
straint is particularly binding in the case of developing and transition countries, so
that "an essential precondition for the reform of tax administration is to simplify
the tax system in order to ensure that it can be applied eﬀectively in the generally
low-compliance contexts". Thus, the potential simplicity of minimum thresholds
makes them relevant from a policy perspective and the description of the Italian and
Bulgarian systems is intended to provide some guidance for policymakers concerning
their implementation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I will introduce
a simple model that allows to study the impact of minimum thresholds in an environ-3
ment characterized by low administrative capacity. Then, in sections 3 and 4, I will
analyze the Italian "Business Sector Analysis" and the Bulgarian "Minimum Social
Insurance Thresholds", describing how they are elaborated and applied and apprais-
ing their applicability as an instrument to ﬁght undeclared work and tax evasion.
Finally, the last section of the paper concludes and provides policy recommendations.
2 A model with imperfect detection
I ﬁrst consider an environment without a threshold and then investigate the impact
of introducing one. The analysis is conducted for one speciﬁc audit class, deﬁned
according to some criteria like sector or occupation, with many diﬀerent audit classes
potentially present in the economy as a whole (Scotchmer, 1987). The threshold I
consider is a rebuttable one, close to the Italian case, where taxpayers declaring
below it are subject to higher scrutiny. I analyze the irrebutable case, close to the
Bulgarian case, where taxpayers are not allowed to declare less than a minimum
threshold in Tonin (2007). The results are similar.
Consider a taxpayer, either an individual or a ﬁrm, with exogenous income y,
who faces a tax rate t ∈ (0,1). His declaration to the tax authority is denoted by
x ∈ [0,y]. The tax authority may conduct an audit to ﬁnd out whether he complies
with ﬁscal regulation. I assume, for the moment being, that there is one exogenously
given probability of an audit, γ ∈ [0,1]. A ﬁne proportional to the amount evaded is
imposed in case tax evasion is detected. However, the fact that an audit is performed
does not imply that the authority discovers with certainty the true tax liability. It
may instead ﬁnd evidence to impute an income ˆ y ∈ [0,y], where y is the true income.
I assume that ˆ y is distributed over the support [0,y] according to pdf h(·) and cdf
H(·), so that H(0) = 0 and H(y) = 1, and H(·) does not depend on x.2 To simplify4
the discussion, I assume that h(·) > 0 within the support, so that H(·) is invertible
within [0,y].
Given a declaration of x and collected evidence of a true tax liability of ˆ y, the
tax authority imposes, in case ˆ y > x, the payment of θt(ˆ y − x), consisting of taxes
plus an additional ﬁne proportional to the assessed tax evasion, thus θ > 1. This
speciﬁcation of the ﬁne, proportional to the amount of tax evaded, follows Yitzhaki
(1974). In case ˆ y ≤ x, the tax authority cannot prove any tax evasion, so no ﬁne is
imposed.3 Given a true income y and a reported one x, the expected ﬁne in case of
auditing, f, is
f = tθ
y ￿
x
(ˆ y − x)h(ˆ y)dˆ y. (1)
The taxpayer is risk-neutral and maximizes expected net income, given by
I = y − γf − tx, (2)
where tx are payments due to voluntary compliance and γf payments due to en-
forcement. Therefore, the optimal declaration is given by
x
∗ s.t. max
x∈[0,y]
y − γf − tx. (3)
After substituting 1 into 3, the ﬁrst-order condition is
H(x
∗) = 1 −
1
γθ
⇐⇒ x
∗ = H
−1
￿
1 −
1
γθ
￿
. (4)
The second-order condition, −tγθh(x) < 0, is always satisﬁed. The boundary con-
dition x ≤ y is always satisﬁed. The condition x ≥ 0 implies that full evasion will
take place, i.e. x = 0, when enforcement is very weak, i.e. γθ ≤ 1. To simplify5
the notation, the two enforcement parameters are summarized by α ≡ 1/(γθ). To
summarize, the solution to the reporting problem is given by
x
∗ =

 
 
H−1 (1 − α) if α < 1
0 if α ≥ 1
. (5)
As ∂α/∂γ < 0 and ∂α/∂θ < 0, in an interior solution the fraction of income that
is evaded decreases as enforcement improves. The equilibrium ﬁne, f∗, is given by
substituting 5 into 1. Expected net income in equilibrium, I∗, is then given by
substituting x∗ and f∗ into 2.
To obtain a closed form solution, from now on I will assume h(·) to be uniform
in the support [0,y], i.e. ˆ y ∼ U[0,y]. The expression for the expected ﬁne becomes
γf = t(y − x)
2/(2αy). (6)
Thus, the cost of evasion is quadratic in the amount of evasion, y − x. The optimal
reporting behavior given by 5 becomes
x
∗ =

 
 
(1 − α)y if α < 1
0 if α ≥ 1
. (7)
Thus, the model implies that a fraction of the true tax liability that depends on the
enforcement parameters is revealed to the ﬁscal authorities. Substituting 7 into 6,
the expected ﬁne is given in equilibrium by
γf
∗ =

 
 
ytα/2 if α < 1
yt/(2α) if α ≥ 1
(8)6
and, substituting 7 and 8 into 2, I get the equilibrium expected net income
I
∗ =

 
 
y(1 − t) + αyt/2 if α < 1
y [1 − t/(2α)] if α ≥ 1
. (9)
Given the detection technology, the expected fraction of unreported tax liability,
y − x∗, that is discovered in case of auditing is
1
(y − x∗)
y ￿
x
(ˆ y − x
∗)h(ˆ y)dˆ y = α/2, (10)
i.e. a fraction corresponding to half the ratio of evaded income over true product.
Thus, it is relatively easy to get away with tax evasion: for example, in an economy
where 30% of the income is concealed, only 15% of evasion is, on average, detected in
case of auditing. Consistently with the low administrative capacity that characterizes
many developing and transition countries, the assumption is thus that an audit is
quite ineﬀective.
2.1 The eﬀect of a threshold
I now consider the impact of increasing the probability of an audit in case of a
declaration below a certain threshold, ¯ x, so that the probability of an audit is now
given by 
 
 
γH if x < ¯ x
γL if x ≥ ¯ x
with γH > γL. (11)
I can then deﬁne αH ≡ 1/(γHθ) and αL ≡ 1/(γLθ), with αL > αH. To simplify
the discussion, I assume that αL < 1. Therefore, even with a low audit probability,
deterrence is strong enough not to have full evasion. Notice that for any given y7
and x, expected income as given by 2, is greater in an environment with a low
audit probability than in an environment with a high audit probability. Following
7, I deﬁne xH = (1 − αH)y and xL = (1 − αL)y, with xH > xL and, following 9,
I∗
H = y(1 − t) + αHyt/2 and I∗
L = y(1 − t) + αLyt/2.
I can now characterize the optimal behavior for a taxpayer in an environment with
a minimum threshold. For taxpayers with high income, i.e. with y > ¯ x/(1 − αL),
xL is above the threshold and, therefore, the low audit probability does indeed apply
if xL is declared. Then, the optimal declaration is given by x∗ = xL. For taxpayers
with a lower income xL is instead unattainable, as it is below the threshold and
therefore the high audit probability applies in case xL is declared. Then, there are
two possible courses of action: one is to declare exactly the threshold and face a low
audit probability; the other is to face a high audit probability and declare the best
possible amount in such an environment, xH. I can exclude all other possibilities
as declaring at the threshold dominates any higher declaration for these taxpayers
and declaring xH dominates any other declaration for which a high audit probability
applies. The level of gross income at which the taxpayer is indiﬀerent between
declaring ¯ x and xH is given by equating IH to the level of net income when the
declaration is ¯ x, calculated by replacing ¯ x in 1 and 2. The taxpayer is indiﬀerent
when gross income is ¯ y = ¯ x/
￿
1 − αL +
2 ￿
αL(αL − αH)
￿
. Thus, for taxpayers with
intermediate income, i.e. ¯ x/(1 − αL) ≥ y ≥ ¯ x/
￿
1 − αL +
2 ￿
αL (αL − αH)
￿
, it is
optimal to declare exactly at the threshold, i.e. x∗ = ¯ x. For taxpayers with even
lower income, y < ¯ x/
￿
1 − αL +
2 ￿
αL (αL − αH)
￿
, it is instead optimal to declare
below the threshold, with x∗ = xH.
Now, I investigate the implications of the optimal individual behavior outlined
above for the distribution of declared income. Suppose that taxable income, y, is
distributed in the population according to pdf g (y) on the support [ymin,ymax], with8
ymin > 0. Then, the distribution of declared income x in an environment without a
threshold, gx, is given by
gx (x) =

 
 
g
￿
x
1−α
￿
if ymin (1 − α) < x < ymax (1 − α)
0 otherwise
. (12)
as taxpayers with income y declare (1 − α)y instead. The distribution of declared
income when there is a threshold, g¯ x, is
g¯ x (x) =

       
       
g
￿
x
1−αH
￿
if ymin (1 − αH) < x < ¯ y (1 − αH)
￿ ¯ x/(1−αL)
¯ y g (y)dy if x = ¯ x
g
￿
x
1−αL
￿
if ¯ x < x < ymax (1 − αL)
0 otherwise
. (13)
Notice that (1 − αH) ¯ y < ¯ x, therefore there is no taxpayer declaring an income in
the interval [(1 − αH) ¯ y, ¯ x). The distribution of declared income when there is a
threshold that triggers a higher audit probability is then characterized by a spike at
the threshold, with taxpayers bunching there to avoid being subject to the higher
audit probability, and by a "missing middle", with nobody declaring an income just
below the threshold.
I can now study the budgetary implications of introducing a minimum threshold.
Without a threshold, payments from each taxpayer, P, are given by the sum of
voluntary compliance, (1 − α)ty, and enforcement, given by 8, αty/2, thus
P = (1 − α/2)ty, (14)9
and total ﬁscal revenues, R, are given by
R =
￿ ymax
ymin
(1 − α/2)tyg (y)dy. (15)
If the cost per audit is c, then the total cost for the tax authority, C, after normalizing
the size of the population to 1, is cγ.
Suppose now that the tax authority introduces a threshold. Payments for tax-
payers at the upper part of the income distribution, PU, and at the bottom of the
income distribution, PB, are given by 14, with α replaced by αL and αH respectively.
Payments by taxpayers with intermediate income, the ones declaring exactly the
threshold, P¯ x, are given by the sum of voluntary compliance, t¯ x, and enforcement,
obtained by replacing ¯ x into 6 and taking into account that the low audit probability
applies, t(y − ¯ x)
2 /(2αLy). Total revenues are then given by
R¯ x =
￿ ¯ y
ymin
PBg(y)dy +
￿ ¯ x/(1−αL)
¯ y
P¯ xg (y)dy. +
￿ ymax
¯ x/(1−αL)
PUg (y)dy, (16)
while costs are given by
C¯ x = cγH
￿ ¯ y
ymin
g (y)dy + cγL
￿ ymax
¯ y
g (y)dy. (17)
To simplify the rest of the discussion, assume that γL = γ, so that the introduction
of a threshold is actually an increase of the audit probability for taxpayers declaring
below it, while the audit probability remains unchanged for those above the threshold.
Then, the change in revenues due to the introduction of a threshold is given by
∆R =
￿ ¯ y
ymin
α − αH
2
tyg (y)dy +
￿ ¯ x/(1−α)
¯ y
[¯ x − (1 − α)y]
2
2αy
tg (y)dy, (18)10
while the change in costs is given by
∆C = c(γH − γ)
￿ ¯ y
ymin
g (y)dy. (19)
The increase in revenues due to the introduction of a threshold derives from an in-
crease in the declaration for those actually facing a higher probability of an audit,
the ﬁrst term in 18, and an increase in the declaration for those declaring at the
threshold to avoid the higher probability of an audit, the second term in 18. While
the former category of taxpayers entails a higher cost for the tax authority as au-
dits are more frequent, the latter does not, as the probability of an audit remains
unchanged. So, the introduction of a threshold is likely to increase net revenues
for the tax authority, R − C, if it induces a large number of taxpayers to increase
their compliance by declaring at the threshold. Whether this is the case depends on
the position of the threshold within the gross income distribution and on the audit
probabilities, in particular on the diﬀerence in audit probabilities when above and
below the threshold, as ¯ y depends on (αL − αH). On the other side, the increase in
compliance due to taxpayers facing a higher audit probability is unlikely to increase
net revenues, as this taxpayers are characterized by low gross income and therefore
the increase in revenues is not going to be substantial, while the increase in the
number of audits is costly.4 The optimal choice of threshold and audit probabilities
is outside the scope of this paper. However, the discussion above highlights some of
the factors that need to be taken into account. In the rest of the paper, I will provide
two examples of how thresholds are actually implemented.11
3 The Italian Business Sector Analysis
Business Sector Analysis5,6 (BSA thereafter, “studi di settore” in Italian) is an in-
strument used by the Italian tax authority to estimate revenues and compensations
for small and medium enterprises, self-employed, and professionals. It has been ﬁrst
applied in 1998 and revised several times in subsequent years. BSA represents a
hybrid between an auditing selection mechanism and a form of presumptive taxation
(Santoro, 2006). BSA is an indirect mean to ascertain tax liability, mostly based on
evidence that is deemed more reliable than the taxpayer’s accounts. However, taxes
are paid on reported proﬁts, while BSA only estimates revenues. Moreover, there is
no obligation for the taxpayer’s declared revenues to match the estimate. A failure
to do so only entails an increased probability of an audit and the taxpayer has the
right to come forward with proper evidence to substantiate lower revenues.
In what follows, I will look at how a BSA is elaborated and applied. A critical
appraisal of BSA as an instrument to ﬁght undeclared work and tax evasion concludes
this section.
3.1 The elaboration of Business Sector Analysis
The number of BSA has increased from 45 in 1998 to more than 200 in recent years.
There is, for instance, a BSA applying to “Retail sale of ﬂowers, plants and seeds via
permanent or mobile stalls” and a BSA on “Tour guide activities” or “Dentistry”.
The elaboration of a BSA for a particular sector is based on a procedure consisting
of several steps. A regular updating is necessary to ensure that a BSA captures the
economic structure characterizing a sector. For this reason a “revision” of a BSA
has to be produced at least every 4 years.12
3.1.1 Data collection
The ﬁrst step is to collect data through a survey of the population of interest. The
characteristics of the survey are deﬁned through consultations with the relevant
trade association. Answering the survey is compulsory, but failure to do so is not
sanctioned. The questionnaire developed in 2000 for the elaboration of the afore-
mentioned BSA on retail sale of ﬂowers, for instance, was sent to almost 27,000
businesses, but only 19.3% was sent back, of which almost 60% could not be used
because of incomplete data or other issues, leaving only 2,168 questionnaires available
for the analysis. The information collected regarded:
1. personnel (13 questions, e.g. number of part time employees)
2. characteristics of the business premises (25 questions, e.g. daily opening
time, parking area reserved for customers, area used as storage)
3. means of transportation (5 questions, e.g. number of trucks between 3.5
and 12 tones)
4. products and customer base (24 questions, e.g. % of revenues realized
through the sale of dried ﬂowers or through the rental of ornamental plants)
5. supply channels (3 questions, e.g. % of purchases directly from producers)
6. miscellaneous data (14 questions, e.g. home delivery services, membership
in delivery networks)
Beside these “structural” data, a set of accounting data was also collected (25
questions), mainly regarding inventory and costs.
3.1.2 Identiﬁcation of sectorial clusters
The data collected are then used to divide the sector into homogenous groups of
taxpayers, in the meaning of groups of ﬁrms, self-employed or professionals charac-13
terized by the same organizational structure, operating in the same market segment,
serving the same type of customers, using a similar business model.
From the dataset collected through the sectorial survey, the most signiﬁcant
variables are selected through Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a statistical
technique used to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset by minimizing the loss
of information. As the aim is to distinguish taxpayers according to their structural
characteristics, the accounting data collected in the survey are not used at this stage.
Using these selected variables, the groups are then identiﬁed through Cluster
Analysis, a statistical technique used to divide a dataset into subsets (clusters), so
that the elements of each subset are similar to each other and dissimilar to elements
of other clusters. For instance, in the aforementioned BSA regarding retail sale of
ﬂowers, 8 diﬀerent clusters have been identiﬁed depending on location (operating
within marketplaces, nearby cemeteries), sale point type (mobile stall, permanent
stall, kiosk), and size.
3.1.3 Identiﬁcation of geographical clusters
Given the importance of location for businesses, an attempt is made to classify the
administrative units (municipalities, provinces and regions) into which the national
territory is divided into homogenous groups according to their socioeconomic devel-
opment. The aim is to capture both the diﬀerences in terms of ﬁnal demand and the
availability or not of business services, like logistic and credit. The variables used
refer to:
1. educational achievement (3 variables, e.g. % of population with at least
secondary degree)
2. wealth indicators (5 variables, e.g. per capita disposable income, bank
deposits, cars above 2000cc)14
3. business development indicators (6 variables, e.g. number of ﬁrms active
in the transport sector every 100 inhabitants)
The cluster analysis applied to these variables has determined 5 geographical
clusters. For instance, one group comprising mostly small municipalities in northern
Italy is deﬁned as “areas with high level of development, high educational achieve-
ment, and developed production structure”.
For some sectors a separate clustering of the national territory is performed,
accounting for their speciﬁc characteristics. For the trade sector, for instance, some
additional variables concerning the structure of distribution channels are taken into
account (8 variables, e.g. number and size of supermarkets per 1000 inhabitants),
producing a classiﬁcation of the national territory into 7 clusters (e.g. “areas with
high level of development, developed industrial structure, and traditional distribution
channels”). Other sectors with a distinctive geographical clustering are tourism and
several manufacturing activities organized within so-called “industrial districts” (e.g.
ceramic, gold, furniture), for which the concentration of similar activities within a
small area is an important competitive factor.
Each municipality, province, and region is assigned to one cluster belonging to
the general or to a sector-speciﬁc classiﬁcation.
3.1.4 Estimation of the revenue function
To estimate the revenue function for each sectorial cluster, a group of taxpayers
is selected among whose answering the survey. The aim is to exclude taxpayers
with “anomalous” declarations, so that the estimate can better reﬂect the situation
of a ﬁrm, self-employed or professional operating under “normal economic circum-
stances”. Selection is based on “consistency indicators” (e.g. value added per em-
ployee, mark-up) and on the distribution within clusters of these indicators. So, for15
instance, for the cluster “ﬂower retailers with kiosk operating nearby cemeteries”,
ﬁrms with value added per employee in the lower 20th percentile or with a mark-up
outside the interval determined by the 20th and 95th percentiles are excluded. More-
over, ﬁrms declaring total revenues lower than costs are excluded outright. These
criteria are determined through “expert judgement”.
Regression analysis is then applied to the selected sample of taxpayers consid-
ered “normal” to determine the relationship between revenues and the independent
variables (structural and accounting). The independent variables to be included are
determined through a stepwise selection procedure. Moreover, the eﬀect of location
may be accounted for by adding dummy variables for the geographical clusters and
by interacting them with the most important structural or accounting variables.
The ﬁnal result of the econometric analysis is a set of coeﬃcients relating revenues
to some independent variables. For the above mentioned cluster, for instance, the
coeﬃcient associated with the variable “number of family members working in the
ﬁrm” is 5,192, meaning that estimated revenues will increase by that amount (in
EUR) for any additional family member operating in the ﬁrm. The variable “cost of
goods sold” has a coeﬃcient 1.1509, “corrected” with an additional factor of 0.0689
if the ﬁrm is located in a municipality belonging to the trade-speciﬁc geographical
cluster “areas with high level of development, developed industrial structure, and
traditional distribution channels”.
The tax authority can declare some sectors to be in a cyclical downturn and cor-
rect the estimates by a “cyclical correction factor”. This can be automatic, applying
directly to the function that estimates revenues, or non-automatic, in which case it
can be applied by the local tax oﬃce to a taxpayer if properly motivated.16
3.1.5 The application of Business Sector Analysis
Not all taxpayers are subject to a BSA. First of all, a BSA covering the sector in
which a taxpayer operates must exist. Even if a BSA has been elaborated, taxpayers
with revenues over 5,164,569 EUR are exempted. All in all, more than 4 million
ﬁrms are subject to a BSA, representing in 2004 approximately 86% of all taxpayers.
There are also other causes of exclusion, like starting or ceasing the activity in the
ﬁscal year, having changed sector during the year or interrupted the activity due to
renovation of business premises. The process of applying a BSA to a single taxpayer
can be divided into several steps.
Determination of estimated revenues Taxpayers for which a BSA applies are
required to ﬁll a form for the communication of the required data to the tax authority
within the same deadlines set forth for the income tax return. The failure to submit
is penalized by a ﬁne.
The ﬁrst step to estimate revenues of a speciﬁc taxpayer is the determination of
the cluster to which it belongs within the sector. This is done through discriminant
analysis, a statistical technique used to classify objects into groups. A single ﬁrm
may belong to more than one cluster, each with a given probability or weight. Then,
the coeﬃcients estimated for a given cluster are applied to the independent variables
provided by the taxpayer, to determine both a point estimate and a conﬁdence
interval for estimated revenues. Only the lower threshold of this interval matters.
If a taxpayer belongs to more than one cluster, then estimated revenues are
calculated as a weighted average of the estimates for each cluster.
Declaration Once the data in the BSA form are ﬁlled in, the point estimate and
the lower threshold are calculated using computer software and are available to the17
taxpayer before sending in the declaration form. If revenues arising from the tax-
payer’s accounts are at or above the point estimate, then the taxpayer is said to
be “naturally consistent”. If, however, accounting revenues are lower, the taxpayer
can decide to increase the declared revenues to that level. In this case a taxpayer is
said to be “consistent by adjustment”. If the adjustment required to be consistent
is above 10%, then a penalty rate of 3% applies. A taxpayer can also decide to
increase the declared revenues to a level between the lower threshold and the point
estimate, provided that proper motivation is given. Finally, a taxpayer can decide
not to adjust and declare the (lower) accounting revenues. In this case a taxpayer is
classiﬁed as “inconsistent”.
Additional criteria to achieve consistency have been recently introduced, based
on coherence of main economic indicators (e.g. value added per employee) with what
is regarded as the “norm” in the sector. The aim is to discourage the manipulation
of independent variables.
Auditing Taxpayers that are classiﬁed as inconsistent may be subject to an audit
and invited to justify the reasons why their declared revenues fall below the esti-
mated value. It is the taxpayer who has the burden of proof to establish the facts
according to which the presumption derived from the BSA is not applicable to his
or her speciﬁc circumstances. The tax administration provides several examples of
acceptable reasons to justify the “inconsistency”. One case is a serious illness or a
maternity status that makes the normal business activity impossible. A ﬁrm docu-
menting that it is working only with public institutions can also have its accounting
revenues prevail over the estimated ones. Another example is the case of a shop
experiencing a reduced business due to construction works nearby. More generally,
a taxpayer can claim that the business activity is conducted in an “economically18
marginal” or disadvantaged situation, such that the results of the BSA should not
apply. All these circumstances have to be properly documented and in some cases
should be certiﬁed by third parties, like tax assistance centres, tax practitioners and
some trade associations. Also the reported “independent variables” may be subject
to an audit.
3.2 An assessment of Business Sector Analysis
There hasn’t been a systematic assessment of BSA. However, some data on their
impact are available (see Convenevole et al., 2006) and are discussed below. The
existing evidence suggests that BSA is eﬀective if properly implemented. This section
also includes some data on the elaboration costs and an evaluation of the pros and
cons of BSA.
3.2.1 Impact
In 2004 almost 69% of taxpayers subject to a BSA resulted “naturally consistent”,
while the remaining 31% were “inconsistent”. Of this, 47% decided to become “con-
sistent by adjustment”, while the remaining 53% did not adjust the declaration. In
terms of the model, the former group represent the spike at the threshold. Among
the ﬁrms who decided to adjust, the average adjustment per capita was of around
6,000 EUR, bringing a total increase in declared revenues of almost 3 billions EUR.
This represents only 13% of the increase that would have been achieved if all ﬁrms
decided to fully adjust. Consistently with the model, this suggests that ﬁrms de-
cide to adjust if the diﬀerence between account revenues and estimated revenues is
relatively small.
The 3 billions EUR ﬁgure may seem modest, but it represents only a part of the19
total impact of BSA. The most likely impact of an established and eﬀective BSA is
indeed to change the ﬁrms’ accounting behavior, by reducing underreporting during
the year.
As mentioned above, there is a need to regularly update BSA. It is interesting
to disaggregate the 2004 data depending on whether or not the relevant BSA had
been recently updated. In the former case, 63% of the taxpayers resulted “naturally
consistent”, while in the latter case the ﬁgure was much higher at 74%. As already
mentioned, this may be due to the fact that taxpayers change their accounting be-
havior during the year in consideration of the BSA, so that they do not need to
perform an adjustment in the declaration. This “ﬁne tuning” is easier for a BSA
that is unchanged, but becomes more diﬃcult when an updated version replaces the
old one, as diﬀerent independent variables and diﬀerent coeﬃcients may be used in
the estimation. It may also be the case that an updated BSA better reﬂects the
economic condition and structure of a sector, thus being able to “capture” more of
the potential revenues. Among the “inconsistent” taxpayers, 51% decided to become
“consistent by adjustment” when the BSA had been recently updated; otherwise
the ﬁgure is a lower 41%. For the former category of taxpayers, the average adjust-
ment per capita was of 6,143 EUR, representing a 17% of the requested adjustment,
bringing a total increase in declared revenues of almost 1.9 billions EUR. In case
of a BSA that had not been recently updated the corresponding ﬁgures were 6,667
EUR, corresponding to 10% of requested adjustment, bringing in 1.1 billions EUR
additional revenues.
The importance of eﬀective enforcement is underlined by looking at the data
disaggregated along another dimension. In 2004, the rules regarding audit in case of
inconsistency were tougher for ﬁrms using simpliﬁed bookkeeping than for ﬁrms using
ordinary bookkeeping. In particular, being inconsistent in any given year was enough20
to trigger an audit based on BSA for ﬁrms in the simpliﬁed regime, while ﬁrms in the
ordinary one needed to be inconsistent for two years in any given three years period.
This is no longer the case. However, when this rule was in place, the risk of an audit
in case of inconsistency for a ﬁrm with ordinary accounting was much lower. This
clearly had an impact on the amount of adjustment in case of inconsistency. In 2004
single entrepreneurs with simpliﬁed bookkeeping performed an adjustment equivalent
to 33% of the required one on average, while the ﬁgure for single entrepreneurs with
ordinary accounting is much lower at 12.8%. For partnerships the ﬁgures are 36% and
10.8% respectively. This suggests that BSA can be eﬀective provided the “threat”
of an audit in case of inconsistency is real.
3.2.2 Costs
BSA are elaborated and updated by SOSE or “Societa’ per gli Studi di Settore
S.p.A.” (Corporation for Business Sector Analysis Inc.), a joint stock company par-
ticipated by the Treasury and the Bank of Italy and active since 2002.
The costs associated with the elaboration and management of BSA amounted to
around 7 millions EUR in 2004 and 2005, increasing to approximately 8.5 millions
EUR in 2006, with labor costs accounting for around half of the total.
3.2.3 Pros and cons
The aim of BSA is to go beyond (possibly unreliable) accounting data and use eas-
ier to ascertain characteristics and their relationship with revenues to determine
“expected revenues”. For this to be feasible it is necessary that a set of such char-
acteristics is available and cannot be easily “adjusted” by taxpayers once their role
in determining estimated revenues is known. In the Italian experience, there is some
evidence that “independent variables” are subject to manipulation (Pisani, 2004).21
This does not disqualify BSA, as far as the scope for manipulation is smaller for
the selected “independent” variables than for traditional accounting variables. How-
ever, the selection of variables on which to base the estimate is clearly crucial for
the successful implementation of the methodology. An associated issue is that BSA
determines revenues not income. Therefore, even if revenues are less subject to un-
derreporting, there may be an incentive to inﬂate costs. This is mitigated by the
fact that some cost lines (for instance “cost of goods sold”) act as an independent
variable in the estimation process. If costs are inﬂated, this will be partly reﬂected
in an increase in estimated revenues, thereby reducing the incentive to do so.
Establishing the relationship between the independent variables and expected rev-
enues is quite complex and requires some time- and resource- consuming preparatory
work. The Italian legislation was introduced in 1993 with the aim of BSA becoming
operative in 1995. However, this happened only in 1998. Therefore, establishing
some sort of BSA should not be considered as a quick ﬁx, but rather as a medium
term process. Due to the complexity of the methodology it is advisable to start
on a small scale, applying BSA only to some selected sectors, possibly extending to
others once the necessary know-how has been accumulated. A positive aspect of the
eﬀort made to formalize in great details the application of BSA is that it reduces the
discretion by tax oﬃcers, thereby reducing the scope for corruption.
Introducing a BSA does not reduce compliance costs for the taxpayer, quite the
opposite. Additional information need to be provided and new forms to be ﬁlled
in. A positive aspect is that the fact that the presumption is rebuttable provides an
incentive to keep proper documentation and accounts, to be able to prove lower actual
revenues to the tax authority, thereby improving the quality of information available
for traditional tax assessment. The active participation of trade associations at the
elaboration stage also increases the informational base on which a BSA is based. It22
also increases the perceived legitimacy of this ﬁscal instrument by the taxpayer.
A deﬁnite advantage of BSA is its ﬂexibility as an instrument to ﬁght underre-
porting. Diﬀerent sectors and diﬀerent aspects within a sector can be targeted with
speciﬁc measures. For instance, in Italy, like in many other countries, undeclared
work is particularly common in the construction sector. In 2007 speciﬁc consistency
criteria were introduced, in an experimental way for the ﬁrst 2 years, to target this
problem. In an agreement with the social partners it was established that total labor
cost should account for at least 13.77% of total costs in case of construction of roads
and bridges, 22% for renovation of civil buildings and so on for 17 diﬀerent typologies
of construction works. Similar measures are also to be implemented in agriculture
and other sectors in which the incidence of undeclared work is high.
4 Minimum social insurance thresholds in Bul-
garia
At the end of the ‘90s, more than one third of labor compensation was estimated
to be unreported to ﬁscal authorities in Bulgaria (Kyle et al., 2001), through unreg-
istered employment relationships and underreporting of earnings. Thus, a part of
the workforce was completely underground, while a segment of the workforce that
remained in the formal economy minimized payments of social security contributions
and other taxes by formally declaring a wage at or near the statutory minimum while
receiving additional compensation in cash. In 2002, social security contributions were
paid on the basis of the minimum wage for 1.2 millions out of 1.9 millions working
on the basis of an employment contract (Neykov, 2003).
To crack down on these activities the Bulgarian government implemented in 200323
two major changes in labor regulation (Neykov, 2003; Pashev, 2006). The ﬁrst one
was the introduction of compulsory registration with the National Social Security
Institute of all concluded, amended or terminated employment contracts. In par-
ticular, a contract has to be registered before the ﬁrst day of work. The fact that
registration has to take place in advance and not within a certain period after the
commencement of the employment relationship makes it easier for labor inspectors to
establish a breach of the regulation, as unregistered workers cannot justify themselves
by pretending to be on their ﬁrst day of work.
Another major reform was the introduction of minimum social insurance thresh-
olds (MSIT thereafter) varying according to sector and occupational group. Social
security and taxes ought to be paid on the basis of the eﬀective compensation re-
ceived. Due to underreporting, however, this was not the case for a large part of
the workforce, which declared the statutory minimum instead. The reform aimed at
increasing the lowest amount on which social security contributions have to be paid
and at making it sector- and occupation- speciﬁc. Factors like average productiv-
ity in a sector or for a speciﬁc occupation can be accounted for with diﬀerentiated
thresholds. Higher compliance for high productivity sectors and occupations can
thus be enforced by applying higher minima, without the risk of pricing out workers
in lower productivity sectors or occupations.
In the year of their introduction MSIT were diﬀerentiated along 9 occupational
groups and 48 sectors. The 9 occupational groups are the following:
• legislators, senior oﬃcials and managers
• professionals
• technician and associate professionals
• administrative staﬀ
• service workers and sale workers24
• skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers
• craft and related trade workers
• plant and machine operators and assemblers
• elementary occupations
The degree of diﬀerentiation along the sectorial dimension has been progressively
expanded, with the coverage reaching 68 sectors in 2005 and 73 in 2007. In 2007,
therefore, 657 diﬀerent MSIT could be potentially established. In reality, for many
cells in the sector/occupation matrix, the statutory minimum wage (180 leva per
month, 126 USD at the average exchange rate for that year) was also used as the
minimum social insurance threshold. The highest MSIT for 2007 was ﬁxed at 851
leva per month (596 USD), i.e. approximately 5 times higher than the statutory
minimum, for managers in “manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum products and
nuclear fuel”. A similar situation applied in 2009, with 85 categories having a MSIT
at the national minimum wage level (240 leva, 171 USD) and the highest threshold,
applying to the same category as in 2007, being approximately 5 times higher at
1346 leva per month (957 USD) (Tomev, 2008).
MSIT are negotiated each year with social partners. In case no agreement is
reached or no social partner organization exists for a given sector, MSIT can be de-
termined administratively by “expert analysis”. In 2005, for instance, an agreement
with social partners was reached in 48 out of the 68 sectors for which MSIT were
separately determined. In 2008, this ﬁgure stood at 45 out of 73 sectors, with an
agreed average increase of 26.6% in MSIT applying in 2009 (Tomev, 2008). The
importance of social partners is crucial as they are likely to be better informed than
the state administration about the eﬀective, as opposed to declared, wages that are
prevalent in a sector. This facilitates the ﬁxing of MSIT at the “appropriate level”.
A too low MSIT compared to eﬀective wages fails to capture most of underreporting.25
A too high one, on the other side, endangers competitiveness and employment.
The participation of social partners is likely to be most eﬀective if, as it is the case
in Bulgaria, there is a consensus about the need to ﬁght undeclared wages. Trade
unions consider the risk that underreporting poses to the social security system,
while employers’ organizations worry about the unfair competition suﬀered by com-
pliant businesses (Neykov, 2007). The participation of social partners in the process
of determining the thresholds also increases the legitimacy of this ﬁscal instrument.
Moreover, one of the shortcomings of using social insurance thresholds is that they
may be regressive if the wage that is actually paid is between the statutory mini-
mum and the higher MSIT. However, in most of the cases in which an agreement
among social partners is reached, negotiated minimum social insurance thresholds
become sectorial minimum wages for the diﬀerent occupations through the extension
of collective agreements to the whole sector, thus reducing the risk of MSIT above
the actual wage.
5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
The policies analyzed in this paper concern the ﬁxing of minimum thresholds to
avoid taxpayers declaring an “implausibly” low income. The Bulgarian system is
concerned with employed labor and ﬁxes diﬀerentiated thresholds for social security
contributions according to sector and profession. The Italian system targets small
and medium enterprises, self-employed, and professional, by establishing estimated
revenues and compensations according to a complex procedure and increasing the
probability of being subject to an audit (plus reversing the burden of proof) for those
taxpayers declaring lower amounts. A major diﬀerence is that in the Italian system
the presumption is rebuttable, while this is not the case in the Bulgarian one.26
The instruments analyzed in this report are rather ﬂexible and oﬀer the pos-
sibility to better target sectors and professions where concealing income from the
tax authority is relatively easy, while not introducing too stringent constraints on
the rest of the economy. When the capacity of employees to conceal income widely
diﬀers across sectors and professions, then establishing diﬀerentiated minimum so-
cial security thresholds or, quite equivalently, diﬀerentiated minimum wages, should
be considered. The application of diﬀerentiated minima is administratively feasi-
ble, even for developing countries (for instance, in Costarica in the period 1988-2000
there were between 19 and 520 minima, according to occupation/skill categories, see
Gindling and Terrell, 2007). However, there is the risk of an adverse labor mar-
ket impact if the level at which the diﬀerent minima are ﬁxed is not appropriate.
This is of course also the case with an undiﬀerentiated statutory minimum wage. If
anything, diﬀerentiation allows to better calibrate the applicable minimum to the
speciﬁc conditions of a region or sector or profession, depending on the dimensions
along which diﬀerentiation will take place.
Diﬀerentiated minima may be used to contrast underreporting of wages, part
of the so-called “grey economy”. Yet, they are ineﬀective in contrasting completely
undeclared labor, participating in the “black economy”. The same is true for Business
Sector Analysis, as ﬁrms and professionals that operate completely outside the legal
system are unaﬀected. However, as it has been seen in the most recent Italian
experience in the construction sector, it is possible to use BSA to contrast black
work that takes place in registered companies.
An important feature of both the Italian and the Bulgarian experiences is the
involvement of social partners. This has the double advantage of improving the
informational base on which the policy is founded and boosting its legitimacy among
taxpayers. Of course, this requires social partners willing to collaborate with ﬁscal27
authorities in the ﬁght against underreporting. This may not be always the case,
but it seems likely that social partners prefer a system in which they have a say to
one elaborated and managed solely by the state administration. To fully play their
role in the elaboration of measures to ﬁght undeclared work, social partners should
be representative and present in all sectors of the economy. Social partners that
concentrate their activity in budgetary institutions and big enterprises may not be
able to contribute with an in-depth knowledge of business conditions in the parts of
the economy in which underreporting is more likely to be widespread, namely among
small and medium enterprises. However, the issue should be seen in a dynamic
perspective, as the involvement of social partners in the elaboration of ﬁscal measures
that aﬀect their business activity should provide an incentive for small and medium
enterprises to participate in employers’ organizations, thus gradually improving their
representativeness and potential contribution to the ﬁght against undeclared work.
From a tax administration point of view, diﬀerentiated social security minima
or minimum wages are relatively easy to implement and inexpensive. However, due
to the possibility of adverse labor market eﬀects, they should be implemented only
after suitable analysis has been conducted. The two crucial variables are the di-
mensions along which diﬀerentiation should take place and the level at which to ﬁx
the diﬀerent minima. Business Sector Analysis is a more complex and time con-
suming tool that, nevertheless, could prove very eﬀective in ﬁghting underreporting.
One advantage of BSA, that makes it potentially applicable also in countries with
limited administrative capacity, is that it is scalable, both in terms of the scope of
applicability within the economy and in terms of the analytical sophistication of its
approach. Thus, BSA could be initially introduced in a limited number of sectors
and in an experimental way, so that the necessary know-how can be accumulated
and the impact evaluated. If it proves successful, it can then be gradually extended.28
As mentioned in the introduction, the enforcement of compliance with tax reg-
ulation is a complex task. However, it is not a new task for state administrations
around the world and successful international experiences can be fruitfully used as a
source of inspiration.
Notes
1See Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), and
Slemrod (2007) for recent surveys of the literature and Fuest and Riedel (2010) for
the case of developing countries.
2The assumption is that the tax authority cannot assess and upheld in court a
tax liability higher than the true one. To extend the model to situations where
this may not be the case, due for instance to ambiguity in the tax code, would be
straightforward.
3An equivalent narrative is that in an audit, the tax authority may ﬁnd no ev-
idence at all of tax evasion with probability H(x), which is increasing as the tax
liability declared to the authorities increases. Conditional on detection taking place,
the density for any given level of income ˆ y ∈ [x,y] being discovered is given by
h(ˆ y)/[1 − H (x)].
4To simplify the model, I have assumed that audit costs are ﬁxed and hence
independent of the taxpayer’s gross income. It may be the case that auditing ﬁrms
or individuals with larger incomes is more expensive. However, even if that is the
case, it is unlikely that audit cost increase proportionally with gross income as ﬁxed
costs are likely to play an important part in an audit.
5See the websites of "Societa’ per gli Studi di Settore" (www.sose.it), the Italian
Treasury (www.ﬁnanze.it) and the Italian tax authority (www.agenziaentrate.gov.it)29
for details. This and the following sections are partly based on a report prepared for
the World Bank project "Hungary Undeclared Employment".
6Unless otherwise indicated, this section refers to Business Sector Analysis in
2007.
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